Abstract -
). Eligibility for the deduction was extended to all taxpayers but limited to those who donated more than one percent of their income. Similarly, a recent provision in the Senate's version of the tax reconciliation bill included a new charitable deduction for cash contributions by non-itemizer taxpayers along with a modest fl oor on the charitable deduction for all taxpayers.
1 Thus, both the Tax Panel and Senate proposals combined two long-standing policy ideas for revising the charitable deduction: extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers and placing a fl oor under the charitable deduction. A fl oor would offset part or all of the cost of extending a deduction for charitable contributions to non-itemizers, while increasing the effi ciency of the deduction. Extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers would be expected to increase charitable contributions. This paper examines some likely effects of extending the charitable deduction while imposing a common fl oor on taxpayer giving and effi ciency. 
Floors, Ceilings, and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer Deduction

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE NON-ITEMIZER DEDUCTION AND PROPOSALS FOR A FLOOR
A tax deduction for charitable contributions has been part of the income tax code since 1917. Initially only high income individuals were subject to the income tax (and, hence, eligible for a deduction) and the deduction was limited to 15 percent of income.
3 Although the income tax was expanded to include most households during World War II, the introduction of the standard deduction in 1944 limited the charitable deduction to the subset of those households who itemized. Proponents and supporters of this limitation voiced the main themes of a debate that continues today. Those in favor of a charitable deduction for non-itemizers feared that the loss of the incentive would curtail taxpayer generosity and, thus, leave charities with less money to fund their good works; they also stressed fairness and equity. Proponents of the limitation questioned the existence of a meaningful incentive effect among those with generally lower levels of giving and income. Instead of fairness, proponents stressed tax simplification and effi ciency. 4 A charitable deduction for non-itemizers was fi rst enacted in 1981 as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 after debate in Congress and among policy analysts. It was phased in between 1982 and 1985 . In 1982 through 1984 , non-itemizers could deduct 25 percent of contributions up to a cap ($25 in 1982 and 1983; $75 in 1984) . In 1985, non-itemizers could deduct 50 percent of contributions and did not face a cap. A full 100 percent uncapped deduction was in effect in 1986, but was not extended in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Failure to extend the provision clearly did not end the debate, however. Members of Congress, the Administration, and charitable groups have frequently proposed the reestablishment of a non-itemizer deduction. 5 The idea for a fl oor under charitable deductions is also not new. Proposals have been discussed since the 1960s. For example, in 1967, Weithorn proposed changing the charitable deduction to an above-the-line deduction with a fl oor of two percent of income. The two-percent fl oor was intended to limit the deduction to those making extraordinary contributions; moving the charitable deduction above-the-line was intended to protect it from tax reforms aimed at limiting itemized deductions. In 1972, Boris Bittker proposed a modest floor to exclude ten or 20 percent of currently itemizing taxpayers. Such a floor, he thought, would achieve administrative simplicity without impairing the incentive effect of the deduction. He argued that charitable deduction was better reserved for the "taxpayer who goes an extra mile than the one who stops at the end of the fi rst lap." Although he suggested that a fl oor of three percent of income would be appropriate, a three-percent fl oor would likely have eliminated many more taxpayers than he seemed to intend. 6 Floors were again discussed in Treasury's 1984 tax reform plan (Treasury I), which included a proposal to limit deductions for charitable contributions to those in excess of two percent of income (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1984) . The Treasury analysis questioned whether allowing a deduction for all charitable contributions was an efficient way to provide the desired stimulus to charitable giving. The report argued that little incentive is provided by a deduction for the fi rst few dollars of contributions since these are likely to be made in any case. Treasury noted that the median charitable deduction claimed by itemizing taxpayers was approximately two percent of their adjusted gross income (AGI), which implies that the proposals would disallow the charitable deductions of about one-half of taxpayers who itemize. The report did not discuss extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers.
Several studies have analyzed the idea of combining extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers with the imposition of a fl oor on eligible donations. Feldstein and Taylor (1976) investigated various policy options including fl oors and non-itemizer deductions. Feldstein and Lindsey (1983) used existing elasticity estimates to examine proposals to extend the charitable deduction to non-itemizers, while imposing fl oors of $300 and alternatively three percent of income. Both types of fl oors were found to increase the effi ciency of the deduction because the reduction in tax expenditures would have exceeded the reduction in contributions.
More recently, in the context of Congressional and Administration proposals to restore a non-itemizer deduction, Steuerle (1990 Steuerle ( , 2005 introduced the idea of a common fl oor under the contributions of both itemizers and non-itemizers, arguing that it would reduce revenue costs, reduce compliance problems, and be simpler for both taxpayers and the IRS. Cordes, O'Hare and Steuerle (2000) examined the effects of various fl oors and estimated that a revenue-neutral fl oor would be between $325 and $400 ($650 and $800 for married taxpayers fi ling jointly), depending on the behavioral response. A U.S. Congressional Budget Offi ce study (2002) examined four ways to extend the charitable deduction to non-itemizers and concluded that the options considered (an unlimited deduction, a small deduction capped at a low level, and income-based fl oors) would be likely to increase total contributions by less than four percent and most of the tax benefi t would reward existing generosity.
FLOORS AND CEILINGS IN CURRENT LAW AND RECENT PROPOSALS
Under current law, itemizers may claim a deduction for contributions of cash or property made to qualifi ed charities. Non-itemizers receive no tax benefi t for their charitable contributions.
7 Itemizers are required to document the charitable deductions they claim with the documentation requirements becoming more stringent as the value of the donation increases. For small donations of cash or property under $250 each, taxpayers must be able to document contributions, but a receipt is not required. For donations of $250 or more, taxpayers must have a receipt from the charitable organization (but need not attach it to the return). Donors of non-cash gifts worth more than $500 must submit additional information on an additional form.
8 A qualifi ed appraisal is required for donations of property valued at $5,000 or more.
The rules regarding the allowable deduction for donations of property and the valuation of such property are complex. While donors are generally entitled to a deduction of the lesser of fair market value (FMV) and basis, there are a number of exceptions to this rule. First, a deduction of FMV is always permitted for donations of stock (including closely held stock) and real estate. In these cases, the appreciation escapes taxation. Second, a deduction of FMV is also permitted for non-cash donations that will be used in a manner consistent with the exempt purpose of the charity. For example, a donor may deduct the FMV of a painting that is donated to a museum, but may only deduct basis if the same painting is donated to a charity auction raising money for a favorite cause. Vehicles, intellectual property, and certain inventory property are subject to their own unique rules.
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Deductions for charitable contributions in a given year are limited by three ceilings. The total deduction for charitable contributions is limited to 50 percent of the taxpayer's AGI. The deduction for contributions of appreciated property is limited to 30 percent of AGI, thereby limiting the value of the non-taxation of capital gains. Deductions of contributions to certain private foundations, where the donor may retain some control over the disbursement of the donated assets, is also limited to 30 percent of AGI. A 20-percent limit applies to deductions for donations of appreciated property to certain private foundations. Taxpayers who exceed these limits in a given year may carry forward unused contributions of each type for up to fi ve years. In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the 50 percent of AGI limit was temporarily eliminated for three months.
Charitable deductions are also affected by a type of "fl oor" through the so-called Pease limitation on itemized deductions. This provision reduces certain itemized deductions by two percent of the amount by which the taxpayer's AGI exceeds a certain threshold ($150,500 for joint fi lers in 2006). The reduction in itemized deductions is limited to no more than 80 percent. For most taxpayers over the threshold, there is a negative income effect on contributions from higher tax liabilities, but the incentive for additional charitable contributions is not affected since the amount of disallowed deductions depends only on AGI. For the small number of taxpayers in the range where the 80-percent limit applies, however, the incentive for additional charitable contributions is reduced by 80 percent.
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The Pease provision is currently being phased out, but is scheduled to return in 2011 with the expiration of most of the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003. In January 2005, the President appointed a bipartisan panel to formulate options for reforming the Federal tax code. The panel was specifi cally instructed to recognize the "importance of…charity in American society" in their proposals.
11 In November 2005, the Tax Panel released its fi nal report, which proposed revising the charitable deduction as part of more comprehensive reforms. In this plan, all taxpayers would be eligible to deduct contributions in excess of one percent of income. Thus, the fl oor ranges from a small amount for lower income taxpayers to large amounts for those with the highest incomes.
Also in 2005, as part of the Senatepassed version of the tax reconciliation 9 Donations of certain intellectual property entitle the donor to a deduction of basis plus a share of the proceeds.
In most cases, donors of automobiles may deduct the proceeds from the charity's resale of the auto. bill, the Senate proposed a small fl oor on the charitable deduction and the extension of the deduction to taxpayers who do not itemize.
12 Although both itemizers and non-itemizers would be eligible for a deduction under the Senate plan, non-itemizers would only be permitted to deduct cash gifts. Married taxpayers would face a fl oor of $420; other fi lers would face a fl oor of $210. The enacted tax reconciliation bill did not include this proposal.
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SOME ECONOMICS OF FLOORS AND CEILINGS
Economists have proposed using a fl oor under deductions for charitable contributions as a way to increase the effi ciency of the charitable deduction: the incentive effect of the charitable deduction would be maintained at a much lower revenue cost because the marginal subsidy rate would be unchanged for those above the fl oor. The additional revenues could then be used to reduce marginal tax rates or for other purposes.
Additional benefi ts may also fl ow from a fl oor. A fl oor provides simplifi cation for taxpayers who contribute relatively small amounts-they would no longer be required to keep track of their contributions and might be able to fi le a simpler tax form. A fl oor could improve compliance because small contributions that the IRS cannot effectively monitor would no longer be deductible. To the extent that taxpayers rely on an absence of monitoring under current law, they may be likely to overstate their contributions or overvalue donated property.
14 There are tradeoffs in considering such a fl oor, however. With a low fl oor, the simplifi cation and effi ciency benefi ts would be correspondingly small. On the other hand, a high fl oor could lead to undesirable side effects. A high fl oor would eliminate the marginal incentive for large numbers of contributors, which could have signifi cant adverse effects on fundraising by charitable organizations.
In addition, a high fl oor would result in an income effect from the loss of the value of the tax deduction. Economists generally argue that the incentive for contributions would be maintained with a fl oor under charitable contributions as long as the deduction is allowed on incremental amounts of contributions. But consider a donor who has been giving only a few dollars over a proposed fl oor. After realizing that only a few dollars in tax have been saved as a result of the total amount of donations, the donor may adjust contributions downward accordingly, perhaps by as much as the lost tax subsidy.
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Another response of donors may be to bunch donations in alternate years to get the maximum deduction. Some could go further and shift the receipt of income as well. As a result, the simplifi cation benefi ts of a fl oor could be lost in the efforts of taxpayers to plan their way around it. Such planning is more likely if the fl oor is relatively high. Charitable organizations adversely affected by any reduced giving or bunched donations may seek to offset these effects by devoting more efforts to fundraising or to profi t-making activities having little to do with their charitable purposes.
12 See HR 4297 Tax Relief Act of 2005 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by the Senate) Section 201. 13 The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005. 14 Buchheit, Lightner, Masselli and Ricketts (2005) documented a tendency for taxpayers to bunch deductions in the $400 to $500 range, just below the $500 threshold for fi ling Form 8283, which requires more detailed reporting about the donated property and the method used to determine fair market value. Previously, when taxpayers were required to attach a statement describing non-cash donations of any amount, reported noncash contributions were much lower. They found that the bunching dated to the introduction of a threshold before reporting was required. 15 Feldstein and Lindsey (1983) term this kind of response where donors adjust their contributions to achieve a certain desired net cost of giving the net altruism model.
The purpose of imposing a ceiling on charitable donations eligible for a deduction is to reduce the likelihood that a taxpayer can completely eliminate income taxes through charitable deductions, especially in the case of donations of appreciated property where the capital gain is never taxed. Ceilings, however, reduce the incentive to increase contributions above the ceiling because the tax benefi t of further contributions is zero. Even if carryovers are permitted as under current law, a ceiling reduces the incentive to give because the present value of a carryover deduction is less than that of an immediate one. In addition, the largest contributions may never be deductible because of the five-year limit on carrying over deductions. To the extent that such large donations are motivated by philanthropic purposes rather than tax incentives, ceilings may improve the effi ciency of the charitable deduction by denying an immediate deduction for contributions that are being made even without a tax benefi t.
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The following sections of this paper explore the likely effects of changes in the treatment of the charitable deduction on donors and on the effi ciency of the deduction. We begin with simple descriptive statistics about charitable giving, particularly in ways relevant to extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers and introducing a fi xed-dollar or one-percent common fl oor under all charitable deductions. This section includes a static analysis of the effect of the non-itemizer deduction and the fl oors at current levels of giving. The following section describes simulations that explore the effects of these fl oors and expansions with behavioral responses.
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF GIVING AND THE EFFECTS OF A FLOOR?
Tables 1 and 2 present a basic look at charitable donations by itemizer status. 17 The datasets provide similar, but not identical, information. The IRS tax data reports the charitable deductions claimed by itemizing taxpayers and distinguishes between cash and non-cash gifts. In contrast, the PSID reports family charitable contributions claimed by respondents. PSID respondents do not distinguish between cash and non-cash contributions, but do provide basic information on the type of organization that received the contribution. The tax sample is large and oversamples high-income households, but provides no information about the charitable donations of non-itemizers. In contrast, the PSID does not accurately describe families with the highest incomes (who are not well sampled), but contains charitable giving information about non-itemizers.
18 16 In dollar terms, these percentage limits have the greatest effect on the donations of the highest-income taxpayers; at lower income levels, there are more taxpayers but fewer dollars of deductions affected by the ceilings.
In 2003, about 314 thousand taxpayers were affected and $28.2 billion of contributions were not deducted as a result of the percentage limitations. Over 213,000 of these taxpayers had cash incomes under $50,000, but accounted for only $3.2 billion of deductions over the limits. The 4,238 taxpayers with cash income of $1 million or more accounted for $11.0 billion of the affected deductions. For these high-income donors, 31 percent of their gross charitable deductions of $35.8 billion (including charitable deductions carried over from 2002) were over the percentage limits and had to be carried over. 17 Itemizer status in the PSID is self-reported, resulting in an unrealistically high itemization rate at lower incomes. We reclassifi ed roughly 200 "itemizers" as non-itemizers based on a comparison between their taxable income and the number of individuals living in the household and basic tax parameters. 18 It is well known that the PSID fails to capture the characteristics of the upper tail of the distribution. Because the high-income households account for a large share of total charitable contributions, the PSID underestimates the total amount of charitable contributions made by taxpayers. billion by itemizers. These totals fall well short of the IRS totals for itemizers, primarily due to the under-representation of taxpayers with the highest incomes in the PSID. The PSID data show that itemizers were more likely to give than non-itemizers (89 percent versus 55 percent), and when they did give, itemizers gave more than non-itemizers with similar incomes. Among the itemizers who donated, the average donation was $2,695; for nonitemizers, the average was $1,206. Table 2 presents distributional characteristics of the donors in the PSID by family income. Over 67 percent of families report donating to charity-some families gave a small amount, but others were very generous. About 58 percent of all families who made charitable donations donated above one percent of their family income and 41 percent donated at least two percent of their income. Overall, the median PSID family donated 1.36 percent of family income to charity. In general, as income increases, families donate a declining share of their income to charity. Table 3 presents a cross-sectional examination of two options for revising the charitable deduction: a one-percent floor on deductions for all taxpayers, and a non-itemizer charitable deduction combined with a fixed floor based on fi ling status ($420 for married taxpayers fi ling jointly, and $210 for all other fi lers). Itemizer information is reported from the tax data and non-itemizer information is reported from the PSID. This table shows the percentage of donors and donations that would be above the floor in each case, ignoring (for the moment) any behavioral changes.
19 Information is not shown separately for non-itemizers in the highest decile because there are only a few individuals in those categories. Under both plans, most itemizers would remain itemizers, but taxpayers whose other itemized deductions totaled less than the standard deduction would switch and receive a bigger tax break for an identical contribution.
There are three main conclusions to draw from Table 3 . First, the share of donations above the fl oor is generally higher than the share of donors because total giving is dominated by some very large gifts. Second, with a one-percent fl oor, the share of donors and gifts above the fl oor generally decreases with income. Third, under the $210/$420 fl oor, the percentages of donors and donations above the fl oor increase with income. This small fl oor has almost no effect on high-income donors. Table 4 explores giving by the type of recipient organization using the PSID. Overall, families make 62 percent of their charitable contributions to religious organizations, and 67 percent of families that make donations give to religious charities. There is little evidence of a decline in the share of contributions going to religious organizations until the highest levels of income. Although those who give to religious charities give more to charity overall, they give less, on average, to non-religious charities. The data suggest that religious contributions may substitute for contributions to organizations for the needy. Table 5 presents the share of donors and donations above the one-percent income fl oor by religious giving status and marital status. 21 In general, donors who give to religious charities are more likely to be above the fl oor than are donors who do not give to a religious charity. The difference in the percentage is large. In contrast, the percentage of donors and donations above the fl oor does not vary with fi ling status, even though married taxpayers give more than unmarried taxpayers.
In contrast to the Tax Reform Panel proposal, the Senate Finance proposal would limit the non-itemizer deduction to cash contributions. In addition to reducing the cost of the proposal, this may also refl ect concerns about taxpayer valuation of property donated to charity. Table 6 presents details about non-cash contributions by itemizers in 2003. Overall, about 24 million taxpayers, about 62 percent of those claiming any charitable deduction, claimed $41.6 billion in deductions for non-cash donations in 2003, an average of $1,740 per return. While total non-cash deductions were about one-fourth of total charitable deductions in 2003, the share of non-cash contributions increased with income to over half of total deductions for taxpayers with income over $1 million.
Until recently, little was known with certainty about the types of property donated by taxpayers. However, a recent data set produced by the Statistics of Income Division of IRS provides information about these donations for taxpayers who claim at least $500 in non-cash contributions (Wilson and Strudler, 2006; Auten, 2006) . Table 6 shows the distribution by type of payments of donations of property by taxpayers donating at least $500 on the 2003 tax returns. In general, deductions for donations of clothing and household items accounted for the largest share of non-cash deductions for middle-income taxpayers who itemize deductions, while stock and real estate constitute the largest component of deductions by high-income taxpayers. While nothing is known about the non-cash donations of non-itemizers, there is no reason to think that their types of non-cash donations would be signifi cantly different from itemizers with similar incomes. Thus, the table suggests that if the current charitable deduction were extended to non-itemizers, we might expect that a large share of the non-cash deductions would be for donations of clothing and household items.
Although the tables presented in this section are informative, understanding the effect of fl oors and extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers requires a more complete analysis including the response of donors. Therefore, the next two sections present several simulations that incorporate the behavioral responses of donors.
SIMULATIONS
In this section, we use the Treasury Individual Tax Model to investigate some potential effects from extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers in combination with a common fl oor for both itemizers and non-itemizer contributions. As in the previous section, we investigate two fl oors: one percent of income and a fi xed-dollar fl oor set at $210 ($420 married fi ling jointly). The analysis considers stylized proposals as other tax provisions are left unchanged. Since changing the tax provisions would affect incentives for both itemizers and non-itemizers, the simulations presented consider both a low and a high degree of responsiveness. The lower response assumes a price elasticity for contributions of -0.5 and the higher response assumes a price elastic- ity of -1.0. 22 The simulations assume an income elasticity of 1.0. Extending the deduction to non-itemizers and imposing a fl oor affects the amount of after-tax income taxpayers have available; the simulations account for the effect of this change on contributions. In practice, however, the income effect has only a small impact because it is a function of the change in tax liabilities.
The simulation results for tax year 2007 are shown in Table 7 . The simulations suggest that converting the charitable deduction to a between-the-line deduction 23 for all taxpayers while imposing the $210/$420 fi xed-dollar fl oor would increase total charitable contributions by $2.6 to $5.3 billion at a revenue cost of $1.8 to $2.3 billion. The simulations imply that the contributions of non-itemizers would increase by eight to 16 percent, and the contributions of itemizers would decline by less than one percent. 24 Simulation of the effects of changing the charitable deduction to a between-the-line deduction with a fl oor of one percent of income while leaving other provisions unchanged suggest that such a proposal would increase contributions by $1.5 to $3.6 billion. Because of the imposition of a stricter fl oor, the simulation suggests that tax revenues would increase even though the deduction has been extended to non-itemizers. Thus, while the one-percent floor is simulated to result in a smaller increase in contributions, it would provide a larger increase in the tax effi ciency of the charitable deduction.
To investigate the effects of the proposals on tax effi ciency, we include an additional set of simulations that examine the effect of the current charitable deduction compared to a baseline of no charitable deduction. Tax effi ciency relates the induced increases in charitable contributions from the charitable deduction to the cost in reduced tax revenues. The revenue cost of the current charitable contribution deduction is estimated at $43.4 billion for 2007. The simulations imply that the current deduction increases contributions by $25 to $42 billion (slightly less under a revenue-neutral proposal). This means that the tax effi ciency of the current law deduction is 57 percent under the lowelasticity assumption and 97 percent under the high-elasticity assumption. Thus, the charitable deduction is an effi cient incentive under the high-responsiveness assumptions, but less so if taxpayer responses to changes in the tax price of a charitable donation are more muted.
Both proposals would increase the effi ciency of the deduction under either the high-or low-elasticity assumptions. The one-percent fl oor would result in the greatest increase in effi ciency, to 94 percent under the low-elasticity assumption and 159 percent under the high-elasticity assumption. It is important to note that while tax effi ciency is a useful measure, other tax policy objectives, such as simplification, fairness and the effects on contributions are also important considerations.
Simulations of this kind are subject to numerous caveats. First, while the elasticities used to estimate taxpayer response are consistent with the central tendency of the economics literature, some estimates fall outside of this range; therefore, the 22 Randolph (1995) estimated a permanent tax price elasticity of -0.51 using panel data, while Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002) estimated a permanent elasticity of -0.79 to -1.26 using an alternative methodology and an extended version of the same panel. Duquette (1999) found evidence of responsiveness to the non-itemizer deduction in the 1980s. Feldstein and Lindsey (1983) review early studies that commonly found price elasticities of -1.3. 23 A between-the-line deduction means not letting the change affect the calculation of AGI and, thus, interact with other provisions. 24 As noted by our discussant, Tom Holtmann, the income tax returns report deductions rather than contributions received by charitable organizations. The tax effi ciency ratio is the total induced contribution as a percent of the revenue cost of the deduction.
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Not applicable, because this is the baseline. Notes: The simulations extend the charitable deduction to non-itemizers and impose alternative fl oors under all contributions. Effects of the current deduction are estimated by comparing it to the case of no deduction. Other tax code provisions are assumed unchanged. The simulations are stylized and do not match other specifi c proposals.
Income classes are based on cash income as defi ned in Table 1 . Dollar values are in millions.
By Itemization Status precise response of taxpayers to these policy changes is uncertain. Some analyses suggest that the responsiveness to tax incentives may vary by income class, i.e., be higher for the highest-income taxpayers. Others note that the fact that non-itemizers do not give enough to itemize may, in part, refl ect their lower responsiveness to tax incentives. Second, the policy changes and taxpayer responses we simulate assume no response by charitable organizations. As illustrated by the charitable sector responses to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, charitable organizations may adjust their fundraising efforts to offset or reinforce the effects of tax policies (Auten , Cilke and Randolph, 1992) . Third, by construction, the simulations cannot account for the possibility that extending the deduction to non-itemizers could be a transformative change leading to a major shift in behavior. Finally, the simulations do not account for the effects of other policy changes that might be enacted at the same time, such as modifi cations to the rules for allowing or valuing donations of property.
THE EFFECTS OF FLOORS OVER TIME: AN EXAMINATION WITH PANEL DATA
The previous analysis examined the effects of fl oors on charitable contributions using cross-section data for a single year. Previous research has shown that contributions vary considerably over time; the highest-income households are especially likely to bunch their contributions in a few years (Auten and Rudney, 1990; Auten, Clotfelter and Schmalbeck, 2000) . In addition, it has long been speculated that a floor under charitable contributions would induce some taxpayers to shift contributions from one year to another to increase the percentage of contributions potentially benefi ting from the tax deduction. As a result, it can be misleading to look at a single year when evaluating the effects of fl oors under charitable deductions. This section examines charitable contribution using Treasury's ten-year panel of tax returns spanning the period 1987 to 1996.
Using the panel data, Table 8 shows the distribution of the average charitable contributions of taxpayers that itemized fi ve or more times over the ten-year period in comparison to the 1996 contributions of taxpayers who itemized in that year.
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Median contributions were about 1.4 percent of cash income and mean contributions were nearly 2.9 percent of cash income both for the average of the years in which the taxpayers itemized and for 1996. The traditional u-shaped curve of giving, with giving being the highest percent of income in the lowest-and highest-income classes is observed for mean contributions for both 1996 and average contributions over the panel period. For median contribution rates in the 1996 cross-section data, however, there is no u-shape as median contribution rates decrease as income rises; taxpayers with incomes of $1 million and over give only 0.65 percent of income. This implies that the typical high-income household gives a smaller percent of income than middleincome households. Because highincome households tend to bunch their giving over time, however, the u-shape returns for the median contribution rate when panel data are used. Over the panel period, the median for average contributions is three times as high (1.97 percent of income) for taxpayers with incomes over $5 million as for taxpayers at this income level in 1996, well above the overall median. Thus, as a result of the bunching of the contributions of the highest-income taxpayers, cross-section data for a single 1996 year can provide a misleading picture of high-income contributions. Table 9 shows the effects of fl oors for taxpayers who fi led returns in every year over the sample period. About 46 million taxpayers itemized at least once over this period and 15 million taxpayers itemized in all ten years. 26 Charitable deductions were claimed on about 92 percent of the returns that itemized. Charitable deductions exceeding one percent of AGI were claimed on 67 percent of itemized returns and these accounted for 73 percent of total charitable deductions; these rates are not too dissimilar from the single year estimates. About seven percent of the taxpayers claimed charitable contributions exceeding the one-percent fl oor in fi ve or more years. The percentages exceeding the $210/$420 fl oor (indexed backward for infl ation) were even higher: 85 percent of itemizing returns and 87 percent of charitable deductions. These percentages are all higher for taxpayers who itemized in all ten years.
To examine the possible effects of shifting of contributions, we considered a simple shifting case in which taxpayers with contributions below the one-percent fl oor delayed 20 percent of their contributions until the following year. Since this would overstate the shifting benefi ts for taxpayers frequently over the fl oor, we excluded any taxpayers over the fl oor in at least three-fourths of the years in which they itemized. As shown in Table 9 , this exercise suggests that the percentage of itemized returns over the one-percent fl oor would increase by about ten percent (e.g., from 67.3 percent to 74.0 percent of itemizing returns) and the percentage of contributions over the floor would increase by about 3.1 percent. While not insignifi cant, this potential response is not large because such a high percentage of donors and contributions are already over the fl oor. Thus, while shifting could undermine the simplifi cation benefi ts of relatively high fl oor by inducing more tax planning efforts, the effects of such shifting do not seem to be signifi cant for the one-percent fl oor.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined recent proposals to extend the charitable deduction to nonitemizers in conjunction with a common fl oor under the charitable deductions for all taxpayers using IRS individual income tax return and PSID data. The proposals would place a fl oor under charitable deductions of either one percent of income or a fi xed-dollar amount of $210 ($420 for joint fi lers), while extending the deduction to all taxpayers.
The data show that most Americans (over two-thirds) donate to charity. Although donations rates are higher for itemizers, donation rates are high even among those who receive no deduction. Most donors currently give more than one percent of their income. Among donors, 74 percent of itemizers would receive a charitable deduction even with a one-percent fl oor, and 58 percent of non-itemizers claimed to donate more than the fl oor. Nearly all itemizers who donate and 65 percent of non-itemizers donate more than a $210/420 fl oor. In all cases, the level of donations over the fl oor is higher than the level of donors due to the effect of larger donations.
Simulations show that at projected 2007 levels, both types of proposals would lead to increased charitable contributions, while also increasing the tax effi ciency of the charitable deduction by reducing the tax cost of the deduction while preserving the incentive for additional contributions for most taxpayers. Extending the charitable deductions to non-itemizers could increase charitable contributions by $2.5 to $5.3 billion with a $210/$420 fl oor and by $1.5 to $3.6 billion with a one-percent fl oor. While a one-percent fl oor would lead to a smaller increase in contributions, it would provide a much larger improvement in the effi ciency of the charitable deduction. Table A1 compares the charitable donations of itemizers in the PSID and IRS datasets. Because the income measures and sampling units differ between the two datasets, the data are presented by income quintiles defined separately for each dataset. The quintiles are defined using all observations (both itemizers and non-itemizers). All dollar amounts are in nominal terms. For the fi rst four quintiles, the averages and totals are very similar. For example, donors in the third quintile of the PSID sample contributed an average of $1,742 and donors in the third quintile of the tax data deducted $1,617 for charitable contributions. About 87 and 82 percent, respectively, donated to charity (or claimed a deduction). In contrast, the top quintile data shows much lower levels of giving in the PSID than in the IRS data, particularly for the top 5 percent. 
